



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

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## Survey of Communist Military Developments in Indochina

DIA review(s) completed.

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June 19, 1974

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**SURVEY OF COMMUNIST  
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA\***

(This report covers the period June 5-18, 1974)

The Key Points

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- So far this dry season, the Khmer Communists have failed to mount a major campaign against Phnom Penh's critical Mekong supply line, and rising water levels will soon preclude such an effort.

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\* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

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K1 16. [redacted] the Communists are making extensive use of the western supply corridor. On June 15, more than 260 trucks were sighted parked along the western supply corridor just south of Khe Sanh. On that same date, another 40 trucks were spotted moving farther south along Route 14. Some of the trucks moving along the western supply corridor undoubtedly are carrying supplies from the NVA 541st Engineer Regiment to southern MR 1 and MR 2.

## II. Significant Communist Combat Activity

17. Communist cease-fire violations in South Vietnam decreased in number during the past two weeks with a daily average of 99 incidents, compared with the previous two week's 118. ARVN casualties for the past two weeks decreased to 37 from the previous week's daily average of 41, while Communist casualties increased to 158 from 122 daily. The most significant activity occurred in the Ben Cat area of MR 3 where all regiments of the 7th and 9th NVA Divisions

reportedly have been committed to block ARVN's attempts to recapture the outposts lost to the Communists in mid-May. The NVA/VC have reportedly suffered heavy losses the past two weeks in counterattacks against the ARVN forces, but have succeeded in slowing the government advance. In a probable attempt to prevent government reinforcement of the Binh Duong operation, the Communists have also increased their harassing attacks in the region and cut Route 1 in Long Khanh Province for a 5-day period last week.

18. Elsewhere, increased activity continues in eastern Quang Tin Province, MR 1, where Communist forces are attempting to disrupt the government pacification program and expand their area of control. In MR 2, NVA/VC units north of Kontum continue attacks-by-fire and ground probes against government elements trying to clear the Vo Dinh area. Communist forces in Pleiku Province overran Fire Support Base 261 on June 10, but were soon pushed out by counterattacking government troops. In Kien Tuong Province of MR 4, ARVN forces recaptured Long Khot on June 9 and are now securing the area. Most Communist-initiated incidents continue to occur in the Delta and consist primarily of minor attacks-by-fire and ground probes.

### III. Other Military Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

#### *NVA Petroleum Distribution System in South Vietnam Improved and Expanded*

19. Communist engineers in South Vietnam are making significant headway in their program to extend a petroleum pipeline to the COSVN area, while bolstering the existing system with new, large storage and transfer depots. Since the 1973 Vietnam cease-fire, construction of petroleum pipelines and depots has complimented NVA road construction efforts; in fact, the two programs are closely interrelated and form the framework of Hanoi's high-speed, high-volume transport network in southern Laos and western South Vietnam, linking North Vietnam with major Communist base areas in South Vietnam.

20. During 1973, construction efforts in Laos and South Vietnam centered on the extension of two separate pipelines along the course of the two major infiltration corridors and on the building of bigger and better storage and import facilities. By year's end, the Laotian pipeline had been pushed to the tri-border, and the DMZ/Quang Tri system had been extended some 50 miles south into the A Shau Valley.

21. Petroleum-related construction has continued in 1974, and it appears that the building will continue during the summer rainy season. [redacted] pipeline was now visible ten miles south of the Ben Giang intersection, placing the line some 40 miles south of its March terminus.

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23. To facilitate the transport of petroleum through the new western corridor pipeline, a series of new bunkered storage tanks and transfer depots is being added along its course. Apparently the threat of ARVN attack still precludes the building of more permanent and economical large vertical storage tanks like those now in place in southern Laos. One of the largest bunkered storage areas is a dispersed underground site five miles north of the Dong Ha seaborne transshipment area. So far, 57 ten-metric-ton tanks have been emplaced in ten dispersed areas. When completed, the facility will have an estimated storage capacity of more than 600 tons and will increase the total storage capacity in MR 1 to more than 2,000 tons.


*Cambodia: Status of the Mekong Supply Line*

24. The Khmer Communists (KC) failed to mount a major effort against Phnom Penh's supply lifeline -- the Mekong -- this dry season, and rising water levels are signaling the end of their opportunity to do so. By early July, flooding will cover Communist positions on the river bank, increase the distance from firing positions to the ship channel, and make overland access very difficult, thereby precluding any serious interdiction effort until next fall.

25. There are several reasons why the KC failed to interdict Mekong shipping this year. Probably the most important was the effective government security measures in support of the convoys. Riverbank security was bolstered by the deployment of four marine battalions and by FANK's ability to keep Route 1 -- which closely parallels the river -- open between Phnom Penh and Neak Luong most of the time. The absence of US air support was offset -- although not totally -- by air strikes and continuous cover flown by the Cambodian Air Force. The Navy -- which last year refused combat by maneuvering to the sheltered side of merchant ships during attacks -- regained some of its former aggressiveness and increased the number of vessels escorting convoys. Overall, the three services displayed an unaccustomed ability to work together and coordinate their efforts, which vastly increased their combined effectiveness.

26. On the KC side, coordination among commanders along the Mekong broke down, confounding their efforts in the area. Moreover, they remained relatively committed to other battles -- first Phnom Penh and later provincial capitals -- with little residual manpower for the Mekong. They also lacked the heavy armament needed to sustain major attacks against the merchant ships. Their


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attacks generally have consisted of fire from small arms, machineguns, B-40/41 rockets, and 75-mm recoilless rifles, which has only sunk eight barges and ships and severely damaged ten others since January 1973.



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